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New Jersey Search-and-Seizure Law:
A Recent Perspective
Peter G. Verniero ∗
My task is to provide an overview of the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s search-and-seizure law established over the past five years. I
will endeavor to fulfill that mission by highlighting the substantive
holdings of previous decisions, many of which you undoubtedly are
aware. Beyond delivering a listing of those holdings, I hope to
provide some common themes running through our recent case law.
That latter objective is a challenge because, by design, search-andseizure jurisprudence turns on highly specific circumstances. A
variation of a single fact can lead to opposite results in cases involving
1
otherwise identical fact patterns.
From that perspective, it
sometimes is difficult to discern a unifying principle among
seemingly similar cases.
But that itself becomes a unifying tenet of sorts, namely, that the
law in this area generally is not captive to per se rules but rather takes
on contour and shape depending on the facts at issue. The court
2
made that point explicitly in State v. Cooke. After discussing the
factors that supported a finding of exigency in the context of a
warrantless automobile search, the court stated that any one of those
3
factors would have been insufficient to justify the search. The court
also stated that “the term ‘exigent circumstances’ is, by design,
inexact. It is incapable of precise definition because, by its nature,
the term takes on form and shape depending on the facts of any
4
given case.”

∗
Of Counsel, Sills Cummis Epstein & Gross P.C.; Associate Justice of the New
Jersey Supreme Court, 1999–2004; New Jersey Attorney General, 1996–1999; J.D.,
Duke University, 1984; B.A., Drew University, 1981. This Article is adapted from a
speech given at Seton Hall University School of Law in November 2004.
1
See infra notes 25–48 and accompanying text.
2
163 N.J. 657, 751 A.2d 52 (2000).
3
Id. at 675, 751 A.2d at 102.
4
Id. at 676, 751 A.2d at 102.
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The court again displayed its distaste for per se rules in State v.
5
Wilson. In that case, the court held that the State had insufficient
probable cause to conduct a search of a vehicle in which the
defendant was a passenger, based on the officer’s testimony at the
6
suppression hearing. Although it affirmed the Appellate Division,
which had reached the same conclusion, the court stated that it was
not approving a hypothetical statement contained in the lower
7
court’s opinion that suggested a per se rule for future cases. The
court stated: “In avoiding bright-line pronouncements in this area of
law, we continue to believe that ‘courts must consider the totality of
the circumstances, without focusing exclusively on any one factor, in
8
considering whether probable cause has been established.’”
Despite the seemingly idiosyncratic nature of our jurisprudence,
the overarching inquiry in most search-and-seizure cases is
reasonableness. At times the inquiry is unstated. But it usually boils
down to a single question: Did the police act in an objectively
reasonable fashion? That question flows directly from the text of the
9
Fourth Amendment and the analogous Article I, paragraph 7 of the
10
To some extent reasonableness is like
New Jersey Constitution.
11
pornography—you know it when you see it. To assist courts in the
reasonableness inquiry and presumably to foster a consistent
approach, the United States Supreme Court and my former court
have articulated standards or suggested frameworks to guide trial
courts.

5

178 N.J. 7, 833 A.2d 1087 (2003).
Id. at 15, 833 A.2d at 1091.
7
Id. at 18, 833 A.2d at 1091.
8
Id. (citing State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 216, 777 A.2d 60, 67 (2001); State v.
Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 362, 823 A.2d 38, 49 (2003)).
9
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10
Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the papers and things to be seized.
N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 7.
11
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
6
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12

As an example, in State v. Ravotto, my former court adopted for
use under Article I, paragraph 7 the same balancing test espoused by
13
the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor to determine
whether the exercise of force by police is reasonable. The test
“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstance of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
14
evade arrest by flight.” Ravotto is not a lone example. Over the past
five years the court has articulated standards or multi-part tests in
15
numerous other settings.
Another basic principle confirmed within the past five years is
that the party bearing the burden of proof in a suppression motion
(for example, the State in cases of warrantless searches) must
establish an adequate record to justify the conduct or position at
16
issue. State v. Wilson made that point expressly. Although the court
has demonstrated a willingness to infer facts from the record or take
17
judicial notice of facts when appropriate, as it did in State v. Nishina,
Wilson is a good example of the limits of such willingness.
In Wilson, the State argued on appeal that the quantity of illegal
drugs found on the defendant’s person provided sufficient probable
cause to believe that the automobile in which the defendant had
been a passenger contained additional drugs, justifying a warrantless
18
search of the car. The problem with that argument, as the court saw

12

169 N.J. 227, 235–36, 777 A.2d 301, 306 (2001).
490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
14
Ravotto, 169 N.J. at 236, 777 A.2d at 306–07 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
15
State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 619, 775 A.2d 1273, 1279–80 (2001)
(establishing a three-part framework within which to evaluate no-knock search
warrants); State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 360–61, 823 A.2d 38, 48 (2003)
(establishing a three-part test for evaluating the independent-source doctrine); Joye
v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 176 N.J. 568, 597, 826 A.2d 624,
642 (2003) (adopting for use under the New Jersey Constitution the federal specialneeds test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), when evaluating random drug and alcohol
testing of high school students); State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 161, 843 A.2d 1132,
1138 (2004) (confirming that three requirements are necessary to sustain police
conduct under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement).
16
State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 17, 833 A.2d 1087, 1093 (2003).
17
175 N.J. 502, 507, 816 A.2d 153, 156 (2003) (inferring from the record that the
defendant was at least seventeen years of age because he was a licensed driver, and
taking judicial notice of the fact that the school in question was a lower elementary
school).
18
Wilson, 178 N.J. at 17, 833 A.2d at 1093.
13
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it, was that the State submitted insufficient evidence to support it at
19
the suppression hearing. The court explained that, “[a]lthough we
can infer or take judicial notice of certain facts in appropriate
circumstances, we cannot fill in gaps in the record to supply the
requisite proofs required of the State under constitutional
20
standards.”
The State also included in its appellate argument an alternative
theory for admitting the evidence, namely, on the basis of a search
21
incident to a lawful arrest. The problem with that argument was
22
that the State did not seek certification on that theory of the case.
23
Thus, the court declined to rule on it. Accordingly, in addition to
its substantive holding, Wilson stands for the proposition that the
court will decline to rule on alternate contentions raised by a party
on appeal if the argument or contention was not first contained in
24
the petition for certification.
Perhaps no two cases better illustrate the fact-sensitive nature of
my former court’s search-and-seizure jurisprudence than two cases
25
decided at the end of the 2003-2004 term, State v. Pineiro and State v.
26
Moore. In Pineiro, a police officer was on patrol in a so-called “high
crime area” when he observed the defendant and a co-defendant
27
standing on a street corner. The officer testified that he recognized
both individuals and had received unspecified intelligence reports
28
indicating that the defendant was a suspected drug dealer.
The
officer knew the co-defendant because he had arrested him for child
support and possible possession of a controlled dangerous substance
29
and was aware that he was also a drug user.
The officer observed the defendant give the co-defendant a pack
30
of cigarettes, but saw no money exchanged. The two men appeared
shocked and surprised in noticing the officer immediately after the
31
transfer. Turning to leave the area, the defendant started to walk
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 15, 833 A.2d at 1091.
Id. at 17, 833 A.2d at 1093 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson, 178 N.J. at 17–18, 833 A.2d at 1093.
181 N.J. 13, 853 A.2d 887 (2004).
181 N.J. 40, 853 A.2d 903 (2004).
Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 18, 853 A.2d at 890.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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down the street while the co-defendant mounted a nearby bicycle.
The officer detained the co-defendant, informing him that the officer
33
believed that the co-defendant had just purchased drugs. The man
34
began to cry, denying any drug involvement. The officer retrieved
35
the cigarette pack, finding heroin inside. Other officers stopped
36
and arrested the defendant.
On those facts, the court held that the totality of circumstances
37
justified an investigatory detention of both men. In so doing, the
court confirmed the applicable standard that a proper investigatory
detention “is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a
38
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”
The court next considered whether those same facts supported
probable cause to search the co-defendant and seize the cigarette
39
pack found on his person. The court concluded that the facts were
40
insufficient for that purpose. While confirming that probable cause
equated with “a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is
41
being committed,” the court held that the government’s proofs fell
42
short of that standard. Pineiro is a good example of the sometimes
subtle distinction between the reasonable suspicion standard and
probable cause.
In Moore, decided the same day as Pineiro, a twelve-year veteran
police officer was working undercover in an area described as a high
43
crime area. He observed a group of six people in a vacant lot and
observed an individual, later identified as the defendant, and his
companion hand currency to a third man, each receiving from that
44
The court upheld the subsequent
man a small item in return.
search and seizure of the defendant, explaining that the officer

32

Id.
Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 18, 853 A.2d at 890.
34
Id. at 19.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 25, 853 A.2d at 894 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38
Id. at 20, 853 A.2d at 891.
39
Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 27, 853 A.2d at 896.
40
Id. at 29, 853 A.2d at 896.
41
Id. at 21, 853 A.2d at 892 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 816 A.2d 153, 161 (2003)).
42
Id. at 28, 853 A.2d at 896.
43
State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 43, 853 A.2d 903, 905 (2004).
44
Id.
33

VERNIERO FINAL.DOC

50

10/9/2005 8:59:05 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:45

was an experienced narcotics officer. He previously had made
numerous drug arrests in the same neighborhood, which was
known to the police for heavy drug trafficking. Using binoculars,
he observed three men move away from the group to the back of
a vacant lot, and he saw [the] defendant and his companion give
money to the third person in exchange for small unknown
objects. Based on his experience and those factors, it was
reasonable for [the officer] to conclude that the totality of the
circumstances supported a well-grounded suspicion that he had
45
witnessed a drug transaction.

In comparing the two cases and the opposite results, it is
apparent that the exchange of currency was a critical distinction.
The court in Pineiro made that point explicitly, stating that “unlike in
Moore, there was no observation of currency or anything else
exchanged, rather, there was merely a transfer of a cigarette pack
under circumstances that had both innocent and suspected criminal
46
connotations.”
The Pineiro court also noted that “there was no proof of
‘regularized police experience that objects such as [hard cigarette
47
packs] are the probable containers of drugs.’” Moreover, the court
stated that: “The evidence did not even include the number of times
the officer had encountered the use of cigarette packs to exchange
48
drugs or what percentage of observed cigarette packs held drugs.”
Another example of how two seemingly similar cases might lead
49
to opposite results can be found by comparing State v. Rodriguez with
50
In Rodriguez, the police received an anonymous
State v. Golotta.
informant’s tip that the defendant and his companion would be
51
engaged in drug trafficking.
The tipster described the physical
52
appearance of both men, noting that they would be traveling by bus.
The caller also informed the police that the two men had left Ocean
City to go to Philadelphia to purchase the drugs and that they would
53
return that same day via Atlantic City.

45

Id. at 46–47, 853 A.2d at 907.
Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 28, 853 A.2d at 896.
47
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 385, 590
A.2d 1179, 1185 (1991)).
48
Id.
49
172 N.J. 117, 796 A.2d 857 (2002).
50
178 N.J. 205, 837 A.2d 359 (2003).
51
Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 121, 796 A.2d at 859.
52
Id. at 121–22, 796 A.2d at 859.
53
Id. at 122, 796 A.2d at 859.
46
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After observing two men matching the description exit a bus in
54
Atlantic City, the officers quickly sought to detain them.
The
officers asked the men if they would agree to speak with them and
55
accompany them to the bus terminal patrol office. Once inside that
office, the police separated the two men, inquiring of each man
56
The
whether he had anything on him that he “shouldn’t have.”
defendant signed a consent to search form, resulting in a search of
57
his person and bag that yielded heroin.
After concluding that a field inquiry of the defendant had
escalated into an investigative detention, the court considered
whether the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
58
wrongdoing to justify that conduct. The court held that the officers
59
did not. The court first noted that, because the police asked no
questions of the defendant before taking him to the patrol office and
had observed nothing unusual about him, the only possible basis on
which to justify the stop was the information imparted by the
60
anonymous informant. The court concluded that without greater
corroboration of the tip’s content, the tip standing alone could not
61
justify an investigatory detention. The court explained:
The informant accurately described the appearance of [the]
defendant and [his companion], and correctly predicted their
location at the bus terminal. We cannot reasonably conclude,
based on those benign elements of the informant’s tip, that the
tip itself was “reliable in its assertion of illegality[.]” In respect of
that aspect of the tip most critical to the analysis, namely, that
[the] defendant would be engaged in drug trafficking, the
informant provided no explanation of how or why he arrived at
that conclusion. In fact, the only portion of the tip corroborated
by the officers pertained to the innocent details of [the]
62
defendant’s appearance at the bus terminal.

The court suppressed the fruits of the search even though the
63
Therefore, beyond
defendant ultimately had consented to it.

54

Id.
Id.
56
Id. at 123, 796 A.2d at 860.
57
Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 124, 796 A.2d at 860.
58
Id. at 129, 796 A.2d at 864.
59
Id. at 131, 796 A.2d at 865.
60
Id. at 132–33, 796 A.2d at 865–66.
61
Id. at 133, 796 A.2d at at 866.
62
Id. at 131, 796 A.2d at 865 (third alteration in original) (internal citation
omitted).
63
Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 133, 796 A.2d at 866.
55
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serving as an example of the reasonable suspicion standard, Rodriguez
demonstrates how the court will invalidate a suspect’s consent when it
finds that a constitutional violation has occurred earlier in the chain
64
of events. Compare that result to the one obtained in Golotta.
65
In Golotta, an anonymous 9-1-1 caller gave a description of a
motor vehicle that the caller indicated was being driven erratically on
66
a public road. The 9-1-1 dispatcher relayed the information to two
officers who spotted the vehicle and immediately pulled it over
without independently observing whether it “was all over the road” or
67
“out of control” as described by the anonymous caller.
Notwithstanding that lack of corroboration, the court upheld the
68
stop of the vehicle.
The court distinguished Rodriguez by noting that in Rodriguez
there was no immediate safety risk either to the public or to the
69
officers.
In contrast, the purpose of the stop in Golotta “was to
protect [the] defendant and the public from a threat of death or
serious injury occasioned by [the] defendant’s suspected condition
70
[of being an intoxicated driver].”
The court also explained that a 9-1-1 call, by its nature, “carries a
71
fair degree of reliability,” and that the information imparted to the
officers had “an unmistakable sense that the caller ha[d] witnessed
an ongoing offense that implicate[d] a risk of imminent death or
72
Moreover, the caller disclosed a sufficient
serious injury. . . .”
quantity of information about the suspected vehicle, including its
license plate number, “to permit the officers reasonably to conclude
73
that [the] defendant’s truck was, in fact, the suspected vehicle.”
The lessons learned from Pineiro, Moore, Rodriguez, and Golotta is
that individual facts matter very much in the search-and-seizure
context, that the trial court should painstakingly review such facts
when evaluating the challenged conduct, and that an appellate court
often will rely on subtle differences in fact patterns when conducting
its own review of a suppression motion. Above all, trial courts should
64

See infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
178 N.J. 205, 837 A.2d 359 (2003).
66
Id. at 209, 837 A.2d at 361.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 218, 837 A.2d at 366.
69
Id. at 227, 837 A.2d at 372; see supra notes 51–62 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Rodriguez.
70
Id. at 228, 837 A.2d at 372.
71
Golotta, 178 N.J. at 219, 837 A.2d at 367.
72
Id. at 221–22, 837 A.2d at 369.
73
Id. at 223, 837 A.2d at 370.
65
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state their reasoning clearly and should describe with specificity the
relevant factual findings justifying their decisions.
Before running down the list of recent holdings, the last
conceptual point that I would like to note is that my former court has
continued its tradition of departing from federal law under
appropriate circumstances.
Both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Joye v. Hunterdon Central Regional High School Board of
74
Education, the high school drug-testing case, provide a succinct
catalogue of instances in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has
interpreted the State constitution as affording its citizens greater
protections than those established by its federal counterpart.
Those, then, are some of the broad concepts reflected in the last
five years of case law. Given the fact-sensitive nature of our case law,
no discussion is complete without at least a brief rundown of the
court’s actual holdings (some of which I already have described). I
now focus on the major cases decided since November 2003.
The court decided State v. Golotta in December 2003. As I
mentioned earlier, the Golotta court sustained the stop of a vehicle
75
based on information imparted by an anonymous 9-1-1 caller. The
case is interesting from a number of perspectives. Aside from its
narrow holding, the court did not permit the Attorney General
belatedly to submit the fact that the caller was, in reality, not
anonymous because a record of the name was contained in a written
76
abstract generated by the 9-1-1 dispatch system. That fact was never
77
brought out at the suppression hearing conducted two years earlier.
The court agreed with the defendant that the State should not be
permitted to “re-write the trial record” so long after the motion judge
78
had made his findings.
The court did, however, use some of the generic information
about the 9-1-1 system that was included in the Attorney General’s
79
supplemental filing. That permitted the court to describe in greater
detail in its opinion the 9-1-1 system statewide. It also is interesting to
note that Golotta was cited not too long ago by the Hawaii Supreme

74

176 N.J. 568, 607, 826 A.2d 624, 648 (2003) (noting distinctions between the
protections provided by the United States Constitution and the New Jersey
Constitution); id. at 636–38, 826 A.2d at 665–66 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) (same).
75
178 N.J. at 209, 837 A.2d at 361.
76
Id. at 211, 837 A.2d at 362.
77
Id. at 211–12, 837 A.2d at 362.
78
Id. at 211, 837 A.2d at 362.
79
Id. at 212, 837 A.2d at 363.
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80

Court, a reminder that New Jersey’s jurisprudence is often cited
beyond its borders.
A few months after Golotta, in March 2004, the court decided
81
State v. Cassidy. In that case, the court considered the emergency
aid exception to the warrant requirement and held that the
exception did not excuse a search by police of the defendant’s
82
residence that had been conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant.
The case also is significant for its succinct summary of the exigency
83
doctrine.
Further, the court’s opinion is noteworthy for its
description of the interplay between exigency and emergency aid, as
well as the interplay between those two doctrines and the Prevention
84
of Domestic Violence Act, which provided the backdrop to the
85
appeal.
86
87
State v. Jones and State v. Sanchez, both decided in April 2004,
continued the court’s jurisprudence in the area of no-knock warrants.
The court reaffirmed the three-part test articulated three years earlier
88
in State v. Johnson. Jones is significant because it addressed an issue
left open in Johnson, namely, the sufficiency and relevance of a
suspect’s criminal history in establishing a reasonable suspicion of
danger to an officer’s safety, one of the grounds for sustaining a no89
knock warrant. The court held that the defendant’s seven-year-old
arrest for assault against a police officer and a weapons-related crime
90
were sufficient for that purpose.
Jones also addressed whether the warrant was based on sufficient
probable cause. Upholding the warrant on that basis, the court
91
repeated an observation made in a prior case, State v. Sullivan, “that
a controlled drug buy, by itself, would not conclusively establish
92
probable cause.” The Jones court hastened to add, however, that the
observation in Sullivan “was not intended to suggest that a controlled
80

See State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 722 (Haw. 2004) (denying defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an anonymous tip).
81
179 N.J. 150, 843 A.2d 1132 (2004).
82
Id. at 162, 843 A.2d at 1139.
83
Id. at 160, 843 A.2d at 1137.
84
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-17 (West 1991).
85
Cassidy, 179 N.J. at 162–65, 843 A.2d at 1138–40.
86
179 N.J. 377, 846 A.2d 569 (2004).
87
179 N.J. 409, 846 A.2d 588 (2004).
88
168 N.J. 608, 775 A.2d 1273 (2001).
89
Jones, 179 N.J. at 399, 846 A.2d at 581 (citing State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 216,
777 A.2d 60, 67 (2001)).
90
Id. at 401–02, 846 A.2d at 583.
91
169 N.J. 204, 777 A.2d 60 (2001).
92
Jones, 179 N.J. at 392, 846 A.2d at 577.
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drug purchase is an inconsequential factor.” The court went on to
state that “even one additional circumstance might suffice, in the
totality of the circumstances, to demonstrate probable cause when
94
the police successfully have performed a controlled drug buy.”
In Sanchez, only the no-knock aspect of the warrant was at issue.
As in Jones, the court concluded that within the totality of
circumstances the defendant’s criminal history provided a sufficient
95
That history
basis for the no-knock entry into his apartment.
included an arrest for aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a
96
weapon.
The 9-1-1 system again was at the center of a search-and-seizure
97
case in State v. Frankel, decided in May 2004. In that case, a local
police department received an open-line 9-1-1 call from the
98
defendant’s home address. The department dispatched an officer
99
The defendant
to the home where the defendant greeted him.
“advised the officer that he lived alone, did not make and could not
account for the call, and would not consent to a search of his home
so that the officer could satisfy himself that no one was in need of
100
As he spoke to the officer, defendant was positioned
assistance.”
behind a white sheet that was hanging behind the screen door, which
101
blocked “any view through the door or side windows.”
According to the officer’s testimony, the defendant “appeared
102
both surprised and nervous by the officer’s presence.”
The
dispatcher informed the officer that he (the dispatcher) dialed back
103
the defendant’s telephone number only to receive a busy signal.
According to the court’s opinion, that “information confirmed in
[the officer’s] mind that there might be ‘somebody inside the
104
house.’”
The officer ultimately entered the home, discovering illegal
105
drugs in plain view.
The court upheld the resulting seizure of
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
State v. Sanchez, 179 N.J. 409, 412, 846 A.2d 588, 589 (2004).
Id. at 411, 846 A.2d at 589.
179 N.J. 586, 847 A.2d 561 (2004).
Id. at 592, 847 A.2d at 564.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 593, 847 A.2d at 565.
Id.
Frankel, 179 N.J. at 594–95, 847 A.2d at 566.
Id. at 595, 847 A.2d at 566.
Id. at 595–96, 847 A.2d at 566.

VERNIERO FINAL.DOC

56

10/9/2005 8:59:05 AM

[Vol. 36:45

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
106

contraband.
Citing the totality of circumstances and the
emergency aid doctrine, the court explained:
This is a close case and the unique facts that justified the
warrantless search of [the] defendant’s home should not be over
read. . . . The privacy interests of the home are entitled to the
highest degree of respect and protection within our constitutional
framework. But there are limited exceptions to the warrant
requirement when the duty to preserve and protect life and the
need to act decisively and promptly must outweigh the privacy
107
interests of an individual. This case presents one such example.
108

Safety likewise was the theme in State v. Diloreto, decided in
June 2004. In that case, a police officer ran a check of the
defendant’s car license plate number using a mobile data terminal
109
and discovered that the defendant was listed under the NCIC
110
system as an endangered missing person. In reality, that listing was
in error, although the officer at that juncture was unaware of that
111
fact.
When the officer first discovered the car it appeared to be
running, its windows were fogged, and the defendant appeared to be
112
asleep.
113
The vehicle itself was parked at a hotel facing U.S. Highway 46.
The officer knew of reports from that location of automobile thefts
and attempted suicides. According to the court’s opinion, “[a]fter
receiving the NCIC alert, the officer called for assistance. He also
noticed that the tailpipe of the parked vehicle was no longer emitting
fumes and concluded ‘[t]hat the engine had been shut off.’”
Additionally, the court observed that “[the d]efendant produced a
driver’s license and social security card, which matched the name of
114
the missing person.”
115
A second officer arrived.
While the two officers awaited
confirmation of the defendant’s status from their police
headquarters, they decided to place the defendant in the police

106

Id. at 610–11, 847 A.2d at 575.
Id. at 611–12, 847 A.2d at 576 (internal citations omitted).
108
180 N.J. 264, 850 A.2d 1226 (2004).
109
According to the court, the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC")
“houses a national network of information authorized by Congress and made
available to federal and local criminal justice agencies.” Id. at 269, 850 A.2d at 1229.
110
Diloreto, 180 N.J. at 269, 850 A.2d at 1229.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 270, 850 A.2d at 1229.
114
Id. at 271, 850 A.2d at 1230.
115
Id.
107
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vehicle.
“At that time, it was raining.”
One of the officers
explained, “it was simply a welfare check” and that they decided “to
put him in the rear of the squad car . . . for reasons of officer safety as
118
well as safety to the individual.”
Before placing the defendant into the squad car, one of the
officers patted down the defendant’s front pocket and felt a large
119
metal object. At first the defendant said that he did not know what
that object was but as the officer began to remove it, the defendant
identified it as “‘a clip.’ The officer understood that response to
mean ‘an ammunition magazine for a handgun or any type of
120
In response to a request by one of the
ammunition magazine.’”
officers, the defendant revealed “the location of the gun that was
121
associated with the ammunition clip.”
He indicated that the gun
122
The officers retrieved
could be found under the car’s front seat.
the weapon from that location and transported the defendant to
123
police headquarters.
They then discovered that the gun was used
in a robbery and murder at a gas station and that the NCIC report
124
had been maintained in the computer system in error.
Invoking the community caretaker doctrine, the court held that
125
the totality of circumstances justified the sequence of events.
It
indicated that several factors triggered the officers’ community
caretaking role, the most important of which was the fact “that the
officers believed [the] defendant to be an endangered missing
126
The court also stated that it
person contained in an NCIC alert.”
was “convinced that the officers did not perform the community
127
caretaker function as a pretext for a criminal investigation.”
Completing the analysis, the court explained that “[i]n addition to
harboring safety concerns as caretakers, the police lawfully
accumulated information to meet the probable cause and exigency
128
standards before searching [the] defendant’s car.”
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Diloreto, 180 N.J. at 272, 850 A.2d at 1231.
Id.
Id. at 273, 850 A.2d at 1231.
Id.
Id.
Id., 850 A.2d at 1232.
Diloreto, 180 N.J. at 273, 850 A.2d at 1232.
Id. at 273–74, 850 A.2d at 1232.
Id. at 274, 850 A.2d at 1232.
Id. at 277, 850 A.2d at 1234.
Id. at 278, 850 A.2d at 1235.
Id. at 280, 850 A.2d at 1236.
Diloreto, 180 N.J. at 282, 850 A.2d at 1237.
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I already have discussed the last two search-and-seizure cases
129
decided in the 2003-2004 term of the court, State v. Pineiro and State
130
v. Moore.
Allow me to end as I began: the jurisprudence of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the search-and-seizure area is highly fact-sensitive.
When appropriate, the court has set forth standards to guide trial
courts and, presumably, to achieve some sense of uniformity in the
case law. Placing those decisions alongside existing decisions in the
overall mosaic of law is both challenging and intellectually rewarding.
And important constitutional rights always are at stake.

129
130

181 N.J. 13, 853 A.2d 887 (2004).
181 N.J. 40, 853 A.2d 903 (2004).

